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I. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing that the “life of the law” is experience, not logic, legal
academics are increasingly turning their attention to judicial bias
and other limits on judicial factfinding.1 For Judge Richard Posner,
“The first thing the courts have to learn is how little they know.”2
And for Cass Sunstein, “Far more progress might be made through
an empirically informed constitutional law” than through a jurisprudence that is “indifferent” to factual questions.3
When it comes to the Supreme Court, difficulties in sorting out
the underlying facts of a dispute come at a high price. The Supreme
Court speaks very rarely about the meaning of the Constitution. So
when it does speak, the Justices must be careful to avoid grounding a
far-ranging decision on incorrect factual suppositions. For example,
had the Court’s views on abortion rights turned on the reasons why
women seek abortions, the Justices could not simply look to the
plaintiff in Roe v. Wade4 (who, at different times, offered radically different explanations for why she wanted an abortion5). Likewise,
when reviewing the independent counsel statute in 1988, the Court
ought not to have assumed that Alexis Morrison’s investigation of
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and
Mary.
** Ball Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. An earlier version of this Article was presented to faculty workshops at the Berkeley, Hastings, George Mason, and
Drake Law Schools. Thanks to the many faculty who offered constructive criticisms and
suggestions. Thanks also to Greg Mitchell and Jim Rossi for encouraging us to participate
in this symposium.
1. For an inventory of some of this scholarship, see Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 779-80 (2001).
2. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (1998).
3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 255 (1999).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. At the time of the decision, the plaintiff in Roe, Norma Nelson McCorvey, claimed
that she was a rape victim. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 403 (1994). In 1987, she revealed that this
claim was a fabrication—a lie intended to make her appear more sympathetic. Lisa Belkin,
Woman Behind the Symbols in Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1989, at A18.
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Ted Olson was a prototypical application of the statute.6 For this very
reason, several Justices steer clear of laying down hard-and-fast
rules, preferring, instead, to speak narrowly and ambiguously about
the issue before them.7
By offering little concrete guidance about the meaning of the constitutional provision involved, this type of decisionmaking comes at a
cost. Lacking the purse and the sword, the Court must find ways to
make itself relevant in the constitutional dialogue that takes place
between the elected officials and the Court. A Court that speaks
rarely, and then incoherently, may well render itself inconsequential
in any dialogue. Elected officials need not reckon with such a Court;
instead, the political branches can simply spin Court edicts to suit
their preferred policy or constitutional choices.8
The question remains: Is it possible for the Court to issue broad
pronouncements about the Constitution’s meaning while, at the same
time, grounding its decisions in the relevant facts? In addressing this
issue, we will pay particular attention to the Court’s willingness to
adjudicate disputes that involve plaintiffs with nongeneralizable
claims, that is, idiosyncratic facts that do not shed sufficient light on
the competing constitutional values involved. Consider, for example,
affirmative action. If the claims of a poor, single mother challenging
an affirmative action plan are fundamentally different than those of
an upper-middle-class white male, the Court—before issuing a too
broad or too narrow ruling—must find a way to educate itself about
how affirmative action works. As we explain, recent advances in behavioral economics suggest that human decisionmaking is influenced
by various cognitive heuristics that bias the decisions in question.
For instance, there is the “availability heuristic,” which is the tendency to judge the probability of an occurrence according to whether
6. Following Lawrence Walsh’s Iran-Contra investigation and Kenneth Starr’s
Whitewater probe, there is little doubt that the Court, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988), committed error by wrongly assuming that Department of Justice policies would
confine independent counsel investigations. See The Future of the Independent Counsel Act:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 243, 251 (1999)
(statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General) (arguing that the independent counsel statute
subverts Justice Department enforcement of the criminal laws).
7. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at xiii (arguing that, with the exception of Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and sometimes Chief Justice Rehnquist, today’s Court—aware of the costs
of “lay[ing] down clear, bright-line rules”—prefers to leave “fundamental questions undecided”).
8. On affirmative action, for example, the political branches manipulated the Supreme Court’s indeterminate 1995 decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995). Supporters and opponents of affirmative action pointed to conflicting language
in the opinion to justify their policy preferences. See Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions,
37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 712-18 (1996) (detailing political branch spinning of Adarand); Alan J. Meese, Bakke Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 489-93 (2000) (detailing Clinton administration manipulation of Bakke).
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an individual has experienced a similar occurrence personally. Moreover, there is the phenomenon of “anchoring”—essentially, the tendency to overvalue first impressions. By generating doctrine in cases
that do not present generalizable facts, then, the Court will likely issue decisions that do not reflect a true appreciation of the contending
interests at stake.
What, then, is the Court to do? As noted, narrow, incoherent rulings limit the Court’s voice in shaping constitutional values. However, if the Justices exercise great caution before deciding nongeneralizable cases, the Court may fully engage itself in these disputes at
a time when the “facts” are better known to it and to the nation. Under this proposal, of course, politicians and lower court judges will (at
least initially) have free reign to decide these issues. But when the
Supreme Court enters the fray, it will do so at a time when it is better positioned both to speak clearly and to make an informed decision.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II details limits in judicial
factfinding. Attention will be paid both to biases that stand in the
way of judges sorting out the facts of a case as well as ways in which
the attributes of adjudication inevitably result in judges having a
somewhat distorted view of the relevant facts. Part III makes more
concrete the claims of Part II. By making use of case studies on affirmative action and church-state separation, Part III calls attention
both to the costs of deciding an issue on the basis of a nongeneralizable set of facts and the prevalence of such nongeneralizable cases.
Part IV explains why we think the Court ought to embrace delaying
strategies in cases involving nongeneralizable facts.
II. ASSESSING JUDICIAL FACTFINDING
Unlike legislatures, which exercise a sort of general jurisdiction,
courts are limited to adjudicating particular “cases and controversies.”9 In this way, federal court judges are bounded by the factual
circumstances of the case immediately before them, especially the
plaintiff’s claim of injury.10 Still, in resolving such disputes, courts
9. U.S. CONST. art. III.
10. In recent years, some scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for unduly limiting its jurisdiction to resolve constitutional questions. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The
Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 447 (1994). On the other hand, some scholars see “standing to sue” and other justiciability limits as a necessary means for the Court to protect itself from ideological litigants who seek to shape the path of Supreme Court decisionmaking. See, e.g., MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING 157-211 (2000).
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announce rules that apply beyond the actual litigants and cases before them. A court cannot very well announce “the plaintiff wins”
without providing some rationale, and by their nature, rationales apply beyond the case at hand, at least in lower courts.11 In this way,
courts act very much like a legislature, announcing rules that apply
prospectively in a particular set of cases.
Still, these rules can be strangely fact-dependent.12 For, as every
lawyer knows, “the facts” matter; they matter in the sense that they
can be outcome—and thus rule—determinative. Two cases, indistinguishable as a strictly legal matter, can present very different sets of
facts—facts that shed different lights on the competing interests involved. The right to terminate a pregnancy looks far different if asserted by a rape victim than if asserted by a woman unhappy with
the gender of her soon-to-be-born child.13 Similarly, the right to conduct intrastate commerce unmolested by federal regulation looks far
different when asserted by the operator of a small chicken slaughterhouse than when asserted by a national steel company.14
Why, though, do facts matter to the Court’s choice among possible
binding principles? The most logical answer as to why facts matter is
“sympathy,” that is, a judge’s personal feeling for one of the litigants
involved. Correspondingly, even if a judge does not actually feel for a
certain litigant, the public might. Knowing this, judges might tailor
their decisions to please the public.
Certainly, these factors influence judges, just as they influence
everyone else. Yet, we think there is an additional reason why facts

11. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 72-73
(1960) (“This rule holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars. And when
you find this said of a past case you know that in effect it has been overruled.”). But see
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987) (contending
that a decision binds only the parties in the immediate case and “does not establish a supreme law of the land”).
12. Of course, the application of these rules invariably concerns some type of factfinding. For example, in sorting out whether governmental action that targets gays is subject
to strict or rational-basis equal protection review, a court’s view of whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic is a legislative fact relevant to the application of a preexisting standard of review. See Posner, supra note 2, at 19-22 (suggesting that this inquiry is relevant to judicial decisionmaking); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional
Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 541, 553 (1991) (describing this type of inquiry as “constitutional-review facts”).
Likewise, when applying strict review, the Court must find facts (particular to that case)
about whether the governmental program is the least restrictive means available to serve
the government’s stated interest.
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14. Compare A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 498-51
(1935) (finding that the activities of a slaughterhouse had an indirect effect on interstate
commerce), with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937) (finding
that the activities of a national steel company had a direct effect on interstate commerce).
See also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 156-64 (1998).
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matter, a reason that applies to the most hard-hearted and insulated
jurist. By its nature, constitutional adjudication involves the identification and evaluation (we resist the temptation to say “weighing”) of
competing constitutional and policy interests. Unlike legislators, who
can investigate and evaluate such interests personally—by holding
hearings, taking polls, studying their mail, and visiting constituents—judges are confined to “the record” that is generated as the
case grinds its way forward. The content of this record, in turn, is
largely determined by the parties before the Court. Correspondingly,
judges must operate around “real time” constraints; rather than risk
a backlog of cases, judges must do what they can with the information that they have.15 Thus, because the Court very rarely considers
cases in which the rule of law is “well-settled,” the Justices’ first impression about the nature and strength of contending interests is determined by the identity, interests, and skill of the parties before the
Court. Good decisions require significant information, and the Court
gets most of its information from the parties and the case that happen to bring the issue to the Justices first.16
Litigants are well aware of this phenomenon and invest significant resources in identifying sympathetic plaintiffs. In particular, interest groups often see the courts as an “alternate legislature,”17 that
is, a place to advance their agenda when they are unable to prevail in
the political process.18 More to the point, when interest groups launch
a legal challenge, they “are likely to bring not the most representa-

15. For a more detailed analysis of differences between judicial and legislative factfinding, see Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1177-87 (2001).
16. Amicus curiae briefs supplement party filings in most cases before the Court. For
a comprehensive overview of recent trends in amicus filings, see Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 743 (2000).
17. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND
THE JUDICIARY 31, 34 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987). For Scalia, some interest groups see the Supreme Court as a place which “may enact into law only unquestionably good ideas, which, since they are so unquestionably good, must be part of the Constitution.” Id.; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
353, 371-72 (1981) (arguing that the courts should not be an alternative legislature because “judicial lawmaking” is inconsistent with the policy and process of our electoral system) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 19 (2d ed. 1962).
18. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 80-81 (1991) (arguing that judges and legislatures will both be
subject to interest group pressures); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 409, 494-95 (1999) (explaining that some interest groups maximize their interests
by appealing to judges rather than the legislature).
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tive case but the most extreme case of discrimination, of fraud, of violation of statute, of abuse of discretion, and so on.”19
Beyond interest group efforts to control the facts of litigation, judicial decisions, in general, are “a chance occurrence, with no guarantee that the litigants are representative of the universe of problems their case purports to present.”20 In particular, because courts
almost always play a reactive role, they lack meaningful control of either the facts or legal issues before them.21 For example, when Jerry
Falwell claimed that he was libeled by a parody in Larry Flynt’s Hustler magazine,22 or when Elian Gonzalez contended that immigration
laws did not forbid a six-year-old from seeking political asylum,23
courts had no choice but to issue groundbreaking rulings in cases
whose notoriety had very little to do with legal issues. Far more often, of course, courts make landmark rulings in cases where the parties are not well known but the facts are anything but typical—say a
soccer mom arrested and handcuffed (with kids in tow) for failing to
wear her seatbelt.24
And even if judges can somehow look beyond these “hard facts,”
judicial decisionmaking is nevertheless bound by a case’s factual set19. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 41 (1977). Put another
way, “Lawsuits do not alight like seed pods in courthouses to live out their natural lives.
They are strategically initiated and strategically managed, always with an eye to predicting what the relevant court will do.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Avoidance,
WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at C1.
20. HOROWITZ, supra note 19, at 41.
21. There are exceptions, of course. Some judges, for example, have asked lawyers to
file suits raising a judge-identified set of legal issues. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD
L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998) (discussing the role of lower federal courts in shaping public policy on prison reform). Moreover, through rulings on motions to intervene as well as the certification of class action lawsuits, judges play some role in defining the facts and issues
presented to them. In affirmative action litigation, for example, judges—by ruling on motions to intervene—determine whether the minority beneficiaries of affirmative action
plans should be allowed to introduce evidence that neither party would otherwise introduce, including evidence that the government has overtly or covertly discriminated on the
basis of race. Finally, courts with the power of discretionary review—most notably the
United States Supreme Court—can make use of delaying strategies to control whether and
when they will decide a legal question. See infra Part IV (arguing that the Supreme Court
should overcome limitations in its factfinding capacities through agenda control).
22. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (1988).
23. See Mary Leonard & Adam Pertman, Boy’s Scrawl May Initiate New Chapter in
U.S. Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2000, at A1.
24. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001), the Supreme Court empowered police officers to arrest individuals for minor traffic infractions. With that said,
the case’s unusual facts seemed to influence Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—who ruled
against the police and told Atwater’s attorney at oral argument that “[y]ou’ve got the perfect case.” Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Notebook: History Comes to the High Court,
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at 18 (quoting Justice O’Connor). And while Atwater involved
an atypical plaintiff with sympathetic facts, it is often the case that plaintiffs are atypical
but unsympathetic. See HOROWITZ, supra note 19, at 42-44 (listing some examples).
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ting. Specifically, even when challenging the same statute, different
plaintiffs have different stories to tell and, as such, advance alternative theories as to why the government’s action is improper. Consider, for example, Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute. A married couple
challenging this statute can argue both that the sanctity of marriage
and a broader right to define their sexual relations supports invalidation of the statute. Michael Hardwick, a gay man arrested in his
home, cannot talk about the sanctity of marriage but can invoke a
right of individuals to define their sexual identity in the privacy of
their homes. However, if Michael Hardwick had been arrested in a
public park, he could only assert a broad right for individuals to define their sexual relations.
For Justices who believe in a broad right to define one’s sexual relations, differences between these three scenarios are irrelevant; that
is, the specific factual context will not impact that Justice’s thinking.25 Likewise, for Justices who believe that the state has unlimited
power to criminalize sodomy (even between married couples in their
homes), these factual differences are immaterial. But some Justices
will draw lines between these three cases—so that the sequencing of
which case comes first may well create a path that binds that Justice
when considering another factual scenario. That, of course, is why
the ACLU waited five years for the Bowers v. Hardwick case.26 It created an opportunity to convince these swing Justices to embrace a
broader theory of privacy than they would have if the sex-in-the-park
case had come first.27
Of course, as it did in Bowers, the Court can limit its decision to
the facts at hand.28 Yet, it is often the case that one judicial ruling establishes a path that other cases build upon.29 Interest groups understand this and, as such, invest significant resources both in looking
for cases with sympathetic plaintiffs and also in sorting through the

25. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the due process clause creates a “freedom not to conform”).
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). It is also why Justice William Brennan initially voted to
grant certiorari in Bowers, for Brennan “had long wanted the Court to confront the [sodomy] issue and understandably saw Bowers as an all-but-perfect case.” GARROW, supra
note 5, at 656. Ironically, Brennan later changed his vote after Justice Harry Blackmun
suggested to him that the doctrinal underpinning of Roe v. Wade might be challenged in
Bowers. See id. at 656-57.
27. In contrast, had the sex-in-the-park case come first, these Justices may have endorsed a narrow vision of privacy—one that would have spelled doom not just for Michael
Hardwick but also for the married couple.
28. In Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, the Court limited its ruling to same-sex sodomy.
29. We are assuming here that stare decisis constrains judicial decisionmaking. For
further discussion of the role that stare decisis plays in constitutional decisionmaking, see
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991).
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sequence in which legal issues should be presented to the Court.30
Consider, for example, the NAACP’s carefully orchestrated attack
against school segregation.31 Before seeking judicial review of public
school segregation, the NAACP launched several lawsuits seeking to
force the admission of African Americans into state law schools.32
Specifically, since “most Southern states did not even attempt to
maintain a façade of equality in professional educational facilities,”33
the NAACP was able to cast doubt on the “separate but equal” defense to racial segregation.34
The lesson here is simple: Constitutional rights, in critical respects, are defined by the “fortuitous order of decision”—something
that “no sensible theory of constitutional adjudication, interpretive or
noninterpretive,” supports.35 This state of affairs is especially problematic today. Interest groups are more sophisticated in gaming the
system than ever before. Furthermore, the modern Court is especially likely to confront difficult legal questions, that is, issues in
which small changes in the facts (or legal arguments) may well affect
outcomes. In particular, the thinning of the Court’s mandatory
docket (so that most cases are heard by way of petitions for certio30. By sequencing legal issues this way, interest groups seek to establish a path that
courts cannot avoid in subsequent decisionmaking. For general treatments of the costs and
benefits of such path-dependent decisionmaking, see STEARNS, supra note 10, at 191-97;
and Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 817-21
(1982).
31. For detailed treatments, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975);
and MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950 (1987). For a more general treatment of interest group sequencing, see STEPHEN
L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 193-218 (1995).
32. See Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE
SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 243, 253 (John A. Garraty ed., 1964) (explaining the beginning
of the NAACP’s attack on segregated schools).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 819-20. Easterbrook illustrated this point by exploring hypothetically the implications on the Court’s jurisprudence if the Court had decided Bowers in 1973 and did not address the abortion question until 1986:
[i]t is a thought experiment worth pursuing, as no one wants a form of constitutional adjudication in which judges always must increase their degree of “creativity” and depart still farther from the text—an approach that would be compelled if every case built on the last one and urged “a little more” departure, followed by extrapolation. We must therefore imagine a sequence in which the
first case simply asks the Court to confirm the conventional wisdom (in 1973
and before, that sodomy is not a fundamental right) and the second case seeks
a departure (in this example, the arrival of the abortion question for the first
time in 1986).
Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 366 n.63 (1992).
Easterbrook explained that the then-existing precedent implied that there was an absence
of a fundamental right of intimate association; therefore, “[t]he abortion case would be
simple after the sodomy case: if the Constitution does not protect sexual activities that
have few effects on unconsenting parties, it does not protect decisions that affect the welfare of other family members and the potential child.” Id. at 367.
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rari) has allowed the Court more and more opportunities to tackle an
ever-growing number of intercircuit conflicts on tough legal questions.36
Closely tied to the problem of interest group efforts to manipulate
the Court’s docket is the question of what courts do with the information they receive. In particular, because the Court very rarely hears
matters about which the rule of law is “well settled,”37 the Justices’
first impression about the nature and strength of contending interests is critically important to Court decisionmaking. Furthermore,
with an eightfold increase in amicus filings in recent decades, the
Justices must develop techniques to sift through and assess the facts
pertinent to them.38 For this very reason, an understanding of how
judges sort through the information presented by parties and amici is
key to understanding a case’s outcome and, more generally, the development of law.39 If judicial decisions are “based on the judge’s
hunches,” as Jerome Frank observed, “the way in which the judge
gets his hunches is the key to the judicial process. Whatever produces the judge’s hunches makes the law.”40
Social science suggests that individuals, including judges, will
overvalue initial impressions, even those based on imperfect information.41 More precisely, psychologists have identified various cognitive
biases that may cause individuals to misperceive the extent to which
an initial impression can form a basis for predictions about the future.42 Such biases result from the application of various heuristics
employed to make probabilistic judgments.43 For instance, studies
show that individuals are prone to assume that very small samples
36. See Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 805-06; Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the
Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 677 (1990) (noting that the growth in the number
of judges sitting on the same court of appeals as well as the number of regional circuits in
the 1980s (from eleven to thirteen) has “creat[ed] an intolerable pressure on the Supreme
Court by generating more intercircuit conflicts”).
37. See Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 805-07 (explaining why the Supreme Court almost always hears hard cases, that is, cases in which both sides can present plausible arguments to the Court).
38. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 751-56 (detailing exponential rise in
amicus filings).
39. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000);
Guthrie et al., supra note 1; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
40. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104 (1930).
41. A study of 167 federal magistrates, for example, “suggests that even highly qualified judges inevitably rely on cognitive decision-making processes that can produce systematic errors in judgment.” Guthrie et al., supra note 1, at 778, 779. For an overview of
pre-1998 law review scholarship on this topic, see Langevoort, supra note 39.
42. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3-20 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (identifying three heuristics and the biases that result from
each).
43. See id. at 3.
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are representative of the characteristics of the larger population.44
So, for example, individuals assume that the average height of ten
randomly selected individuals will reflect the average height of the
population at large.45 Further, studies have identified a second and
related heuristic—the “availability” heuristic. More precisely, studies
show that humans tend to assign probabilities of an occurrence based
in part on whether they have personal experience with such an
event.46 So, for instance, individuals who have recently witnessed an
automobile accident will assign a higher probability to such an occurrence than individuals without such an experience.47 Availability and
representativeness, in other words, operate as default rules which
make particularized cost-benefit assessments less necessary and, in
this way, serve as shortcuts that reduce the amount of information
that a decisionmaker must gather.48 Finally, other studies show that
individuals will “anchor” their views of an issue or situation on their
initial assessment, even if that assessment is based upon less-thanperfect information.49 Such anchoring effectively economizes on the
amount of information that humans must process, protecting us from
“information overload” and improving the quality of decisions.50
44. See id. at 5-7; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small
Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 105 (1971).
45. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 42, at 6.
46. See id. at 11. Correspondingly, “memory stories” play a large role in an individual’s understanding of facts. Rather than look to the “raw” evidence in reaching a final
judgment, “decision makers construct [and rely upon] an intermediate summary representation.” Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, Implications of the Story Model for the Trial
Judge’s Behavior, in FILTERING AND ANALYZING EVIDENCE IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 165,
167 (Marilyn T. MacCrimmon & Monique Ouellette eds., 1993). Consider, for example, the
O.J. Simpson murder trial. “African Americans know of many more stories (some apocryphal) of police racism and police brutality directed against members of their race than do
White Americans.” Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, Explanation-Based Decision Making,
in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 212, 216 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000). Consequently, African Americans were far more likely than
whites to think that the police planted incriminating evidence. Id.
47. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 230 (1973); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 42, at 11.
48. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1189
(1997) (referring to such heuristics as “second-order decisions” which reduce decision
costs).
49. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 42, at 16-18. Relatedly, experts who are personally involved in a topic are more likely to find statistical evidence persuasive than are
individuals with little or no preexisting knowledge. For nonexperts, vivid narratives (by
creating a memorable and compelling anchor) are especially persuasive. See Elissa Lee &
Laura Leets, Persuasive Storytelling by Hate Groups Online, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 927,
930-31 (2002); see also Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of
Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003).
50. See infra note 65 and accompanying text; see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (“While the
heuristics are useful on average (which explains how they become adopted), they lead to
errors in particular circumstances. This means that someone using such a rule of thumb
may be behaving rationally in the sense of economizing on thinking time, but such a per-
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Moreover, once anchored, views or opinions are difficult to change,
even if substantial information is adduced that tends to undermine
the initial impression.51
The existence of these various heuristics is, of course, a purely
psychological phenomenon, external, one might say, to jurisprudence.
Still, by itself, the phenomenon would demand attention by lawyers,
judges, and legislators seeking to minimize the distortions it might
bring to the legal system. Because a judge’s understanding of the
pertinent facts figures prominently in the standards of review that
courts employ,52 the shortcuts that judges use to sort through the volumes of information presented to them is critically important to the
development of law. Judges, in other words, see the information present in the particular case before them as part of a puzzle that they
must sort out in order to resolve that case.53 As such, the science of
judging requires judges to employ such information, precedent, and
other sources of constitutional meaning to generate and apply a new
rule that will itself serve as a paradigm (precedent) for solving ostensibly similar problems in the future.54
The problem, of course, is that the heuristics that judges employ
can produce systematic errors in judgment.55 Operating as shortcuts

son will nonetheless make forecasts that are different from those that emerge from the
standard rational-choice model.”).
51. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 41 (1980) (“[O]nce subjects have made a first pass at
a problem, the initial judgment may prove remarkably resistant to further information, alternative modes of reasoning, and even logical or evidentiary challenges.”); Paul Slovic &
Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 649
(1971).
52. See supra note 12; see also William S. Laufer & Steven D. Walt, The Law and Psychology of Precedent, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 39, 48-50 (D.K. Kagehiro &
W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (asserting that judges might “anchor” on their first impression as
“an exemplar of the population from which it is drawn”).
53. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 35-42 (2d ed.
1970) (describing “[n]ormal science as [p]uzzle-solving”).
54. See id. at 23, 38-41 (analogizing scientific paradigms to “judicial decision[s] in the
common law” and describing the role of rules in constructing paradigms); Laufer & Walt,
supra note 52, at 48-50. In this way, of course, judges are different from legislators, who
can “solve” the problem without generating any rule whatsoever, that is, by splitting the
baby. Indeed, courts pay a high price for acting in this manner, as the Court learned in Roe
when it announced the trimester framework. See generally BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG &
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1993) (detailing political fallout following the Court’s decision in Roe).
55. See Guthrie et al., supra note 1, at 780-81 (demonstrating how heuristics result in
such systematic errors); see also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1085 (2000) (“[S]ystematic errors arise from the use of decision-making heuristics that simplify decision-making tasks . . . .”). For a contrary argument suggesting that
legal scholars employing behavioral economics often misunderstand the social science evidence that lies at the foundation of behavioral economics, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking
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that reduce decision costs, heuristic devices magnify errors in the
baseline data set. Consider, for example, the related phenomenons of
availability and anchoring. Since first impressions do not always
provide useful exemplars of the characteristics of the population at
issue, there is an obvious risk that courts will have the “wrong” first
impression. And since courts often generate rules based on first impressions, overreliance on a nonrepresentative anchor will generate
the wrong rule. Courts, then, are subject to so-called “availability
cascades” in which relatively rare and unimportant events create
widespread misperceptions and, with them, snowball effects.56 Litigants understand this and, consequently, search out sympathetic
plaintiffs to air their grievances. More to the point, by seeing themselves as “availability entrepreneurs,” litigants will present courts
with a very selective and polarized set of “facts” from which to make
a decision.57 Even judges that are highly skilled at analyzing arguments and evidence will have no reliable mechanism to determine
which side is “right” or to which side the scale is tipped.58 Indeed, the
“subtleties of how anchors affect decision making might simply lie
beyond the basic intuitions of judges,”59 and as such, judges often
utilize anchors that appear to be relevant but are in fact erroneous.60
Making matters worse, even a judge that wishes to change his
mind will face other costs of doing so, costs that are unrelated to the
biases we have described and instead inherent in what it means to be
a judge, at least in our legal culture. To begin with, predictability
and certainty in the legal system demand a strong presumption that
like cases be treated alike. A Court that made clear that every past
decision was constantly “up for grabs” would sow confusion among
the public, vastly increase its own docket, and call into question its
own competence.61 Moreover, by signaling that any particular decision might have a very short half-life, the Court could dampen the

Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis
of the Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002).
56. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999).
57. See id. at 687 (explaining that “availability entrepreneurs” will attempt to use
their knowledge of availability cascades to “advance their own agendas”).
58. Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein put it this way: “Judges are subject to the availability heuristic, vulnerable to informational biases, and responsive to reputational incentives. All this leaves them open to the influences of availability cascades.” Id. at 765.
59. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 98 (2000).
60. See Guthrie et al., supra note 1, at 787-94 (discussing an empirical study of 167
federal magistrates that demonstrates that judges commit error this way).
61. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (“[T]he
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could
be reopened in every case . . . .”); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992)
(“There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts.”).
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incentives that litigants—particularly institutional litigants—might
have to invest resources in litigation in the first place.62
As described thus far, cognitive biases, when combined with various aspects of judicial culture, would appear to have far-reaching
consequences. More precisely, this combination would seem to ensure
that, other things being equal, constitutional doctrine will necessarily be hopelessly incoherent. We do not, however, believe that such a
pessimistic prediction would be justified. The various biases that we
have described do not by themselves produce ill-informed decisions.
As noted earlier, these various heuristics often serve laudable purposes. To begin with, they may reduce the costs of decisionmaking by
dispensing with the requirement of gathering large amounts of information.63 “It is entirely rational,” as Judge Richard Posner observed, “to rely on anecdotal evidence in the absence of better evidence.”64 Put another way, the process by which a decision is made
can be perfectly rational given the circumstances at the time even if
the outcome is apparently irrational in light of all information and
rationality (which may or may not be available at the time of the decision).
Courts (especially the Supreme Court) therefore should seek to
gain an understanding of how these mental shortcuts work. Not only
will such an understanding help courts avoid errors caused by inappropriately relying on these devices; such heuristics can also improve
the quality of the decisions made, by attenuating the effects of “information overload.”65 Thus, when first impressions are the correct
ones, these biases reduce the costs and increase the probability of
reaching the correct decisions. Contrariwise, cognitive biases only
produce mistakes when first impressions are not typical of subsequent ones, that is, when information sets on which decisions are
based are heterogenous. Translated to the context of litigation, cognitive biases will lead to inaccurate results whenever the first case that
62. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing how stare decisis encourages institutional and other litigants to invest in socially useful information); cf. PAUL H.
RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT RULES 125
(1983) (explaining the importance of stare decisis when applied to business litigants and
the administrative process).
63. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
64. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1551, 1572 (1998). Likewise, Posner argues that “[l]imited information must not be
confused with irrationality.” Id. at 1573. With that said, Posner does not argue that decisionmakers should not engage in factfinding in order to improve the data set that grounds
their decisionmaking. Quite the contrary, Posner argues that courts would benefit from
additional empirical evidence when sorting out legislative facts. See id. at 1570-75.
65. Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123, 127 (1980-81) (“People use a number of
simplifying operations, called ‘heuristics,’ to reduce the complexity of information which
must be integrated to yield a decision. These simplifying strategies often lead to errors in
judgment.”).
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presents an issue to the Court is “nongeneralizable,” that is, when it
generates a record for decision that does not apprise the Court of the
true nature and strength of the contending constitutional values at
stake. More precisely, a case is nongeneralizable, and thus likely to
produce inaccurate results, if the parties before the Court and the effects on them of any rule the Court might pronounce are not representative of the manner in which the rule will actually operate in the
real world with respect to the cases that it will govern. Where, on the
other hand, the first case that presents an issue to the Court is generalizable, that is, fairly representative of the strength and nature of
contending interests, the cognitive biases we have identified will
have no effect upon the accuracy of the Court’s decisions.
Any prediction about the extent to which various cognitive biases
will affect the accuracy of judicial doctrine must depend upon some
appraisal of the likelihood that cases reaching the Court will, in fact,
be nongeneralizable. In the next Part, we will begin tackling this issue. Specifically, through case studies on affirmative action and
separation of church and state, we will call attention to the costs of
overgeneralizing from a limited data set.
III. CASE STUDIES
Courts, as discussed above, are very much bound by the record of
the case before them. Unlike legislators, who can personally investigate competing constitutional and policy interests—by holding hearings, taking polls, visiting constituents, and the like—judges almost
always look to the record that is generated as a case grinds its way
forward. And while policymaking judges may find ways to supplement this record, it is nevertheless true that the content of this record is largely determined by the parties before the court.
How likely is it that the record in one case is generalizable to the
broad range of issues that are raised by it? Common sense suggests
that this likelihood will depend upon a variety of factors, among
them standing doctrine, the wisdom with which the Court selects
cases for review, resources available to certain classes of litigants, incentives various potential litigants might face, and the strategies
adopted by institutional litigants who are repeat players and presumably understand better than most just how much “the facts matter.” If, for instance, anyone can challenge governmental action, one
might expect a wide variety of plaintiffs and a high probability that
cases reaching the Court would be nongeneralizable.66 Such cases
66. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The interests [taxpayers] represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at
random from among the general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike.”).
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will entail what is, in effect, an advisory opinion or, what may be
worse, an opinion based upon idiosyncratic facts.67
Below, through case studies on affirmative action and separation
of church and state, we call attention to the risks of the Court
grounding its decisionmaking on a nongeneralizable set of facts. Extrapolating from these case studies, moreover, we argue that there is
substantial risk that the facts before the Court will be atypical, not
generalizable. Correspondingly, to the extent that “availability entrepreneurs” (many of whom are experienced institutional advocates)
succeed in controlling the facts and issues before the Court,68 these
case studies vividly illustrate the risks of the Court jumping into a
dispute without first taking steps to make sure that it has a good
grasp of the range of cases that it might confront.
A. Affirmative Action: The Case of College and University
Admissions
Racial preferences are found in numerous governmental programs
and take a variety of forms, the most common of which are “plus systems.”69 Under such programs, race or ethnicity is merely one of several factors that a decisionmaker must employ when awarding a government benefit.70 Such preferences, it should be noted, are generally
not designed to remedy prior discrimination or otherwise achieve
some notion of racial justice.71 Instead, they usually rest upon the
67. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that the Article III case or controversy requirement ensures “that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action” (emphasis added)); see also United
States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (“[Advisory] opinions, such advance expressions of legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused because they are not pressed
before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely
framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests, we have consistently refused to give.”); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1002, 1006 (1924) (“[A]dvisory opinions are bound to move in an unreal atmosphere.
The impact of actuality and the intensities of immediacy are wanting. In the attitude of
court and counsel, in the vigor of adequate representation of the facts behind legislation
(lamentably inadequate even in contested litigation) there is thus a wide gulf of difference,
partly rooted in psychologic factors, between opinions in advance of legislation and decisions in litigation after such proposals are embodied into law. Advisory opinions are rendered upon sterilized and mutilated issues.”).
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-36 (2003).
70. See id.
71. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court concluded that state colleges and universities have a compelling interest in diversity. Id. at 328-33. In so doing, the Court did
not consider whether race discrimination contributed to minority underrepresentation at
the University of Michigan. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
313-15 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (opining that diversity constituted a compelling state interest despite absence of findings of past discrimination).
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conclusion that, other things being equal, an individual’s minority
status will further the objective of the program in question.72 For instance, the FCC’s practice of awarding a plus to minority applicants
for broadcast licenses rested upon the belief that minority voices
were underrepresented on the nation’s airwaves, and that consumers
of broadcasting would benefit from more diverse airwaves.73
“Plus factor” programs, we argue below, will often involve disputes that are “nongeneralizable,” that is, cases that produce records
that offer a distorted picture of the nature and strength of the competing values at stake. Most notably, we believe that classes of individuals that constitute potential plaintiffs in “plus factor” cases will
be notably heterogeneous, even idiosyncratic, with the result that
litigation involving such parties will produce records that reflect incomplete information about the operation of the programs in question. For this very reason, we think that Justice Powell committed
error in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.74 By speaking about the constitutionality of so-called “plus factor” programs
without any understanding of the costs and benefits of such programs, Justice Powell transformed the debate over preferences without a sufficient grounding in the facts of affirmative action.75
Consider two not-so-hypothetical plaintiffs. One, Allan Bakke, is a
white male of German descent and a graduate of a prestigious state
university.76 Mr. Bakke, who is significantly older than nearly all
other applicants, is applying to law school. While his academic credentials are significantly better than those of the favored minorities
admitted, they are about average for individuals who are not members of favored minority groups. A second, Cheryl Hopwood, is a
white female graduate of a less-than-prestigious public college.77 Ms.
Hopwood worked her way through college, all the while raising a

72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 530 (finding that diversity confers substantial educational
benefits).
73. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C. 2d 979, 980-81 (1978); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552-58, 566
(1990) (sustaining preferences on these grounds). With that said, the FCC claimed that societal discrimination was the cause of minority underrepresentation in broadcasting and,
as such, there is a remedial undercurrent running through FCC diversity preferences. See
Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV.
125, 153 (1990).
74. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
75. See id. at 312-20.
76. Bakke graduated from the University of Minnesota. See Americans.net, A Brief
History of Civil Rights in the United States of America: The Bakke Case, at
http://www.africanamericans.com/thebakkecase.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
77. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 564 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that Cheryl
Hopwood received an accounting degree from California State University in Sacramento),
rev’d, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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mentally handicapped child and mentoring other children.78 She is
now twenty-eight years old, older than most applicants to law school.
Assume now that each of these plaintiffs challenges the system of
racial preferences in place at the University of Texas Law School in
1992. Under the so-called “Texas plan,” all applicants were assigned
a score—the so-called “Texas Index”—based upon their LSAT score
and undergraduate grade point average.79 Moreover, the plan provided that non-minorities with a Texas Index score of 199 have a better-than-ninety-percent chance of being admitted, while nonminorities with a Texas Index score of 192 are presumptively rejected.80 Favored minorities with a Texas Index score of 189—below
the presumptive deny score for other applicants—are automatically
admitted.81
Assume that Cheryl Hopwood has a Texas Index score of 199, in
the range of presumptive admission. Allan Bakke has a score of 197,
just outside the range of presumptive admission, but within the
range of discretionary admission (“on the bubble”). Texas considers
Bakke’s file, finds him indistinguishable from hundreds of other individuals who were on the bubble, and rejects him. Moreover, where
Cheryl Hopwood is concerned, the school takes the extraordinary
step of adjusting her Texas Index score downward, purportedly because her undergraduate degree is from a less-than-prestigious
school.82
Because the Texas plan treats individuals differently on account
of their race, it must, at a minimum, be justified.83 Assume for the
sake of argument that Texas seeks to justify its plan as an attempt to
enhance the diversity of the student body so as to provide a more enriching educational experience for all students.84 Texas also claims
that it wishes to reach out to provide educational opportunities to individuals who are members of racial groups that were once deprived
of such opportunities.85 More precisely, instead of relying simply
upon generalized indicia of academic merit, Texas says, it wants to
give “individualized consideration” to every attribute that applicants
might possess which bears on the ability of individuals to contribute
to the educational process. In a sense, Texas could assert that it is
78. See id. (noting that Cheryl Hopwood worked twenty to thirty hours per week in
college, was active in Big Brothers and Big Sisters, and was raising a child born with cerebral palsy).
79. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996).
80. See id. at 936-37.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 938; see also id. at 935-36 (noting that almost all of the applicants with
Texas Index scores in the presumptive admit range were admitted).
83. See id. at 940 (applying strict scrutiny analysis to the Texas plan).
84. Id. at 944-48.
85. Id. at 948-55.

340

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:323

not really considering applicants’ race as such but is instead considering race incidentally to a consideration of the whole person.86
How might these two plaintiffs respond to the assertion that diversity is an interest of sufficient strength to justify their exclusion
because of their race? They could, in the abstract, question whether
diversity is an important or compelling interest of the sort that justifies race-based line drawing. Moreover, in arguing that diversity is
not a compelling interest, these plaintiffs would be placed in the position of questioning determinations to the contrary by the admitted
“experts” on the subject—academics—determinations that would be
defended with great vigor by the academy and other interest
groups.87 These plaintiffs would also have to deal with the assertion
that such preferences are not really racial line drawing, but instead
merely incidental to the individualized consideration of each applicant.88
A straightforward attack on diversity as a compelling interest,
then, would certainly be an uphill battle. There is, however, another
tack that plaintiffs could take, a tack that does not require them to
debate academics about the theoretical benefits of diversity. Such a
tack, however, would only be available to Ms. Hopwood, and not Mr.
Bakke. To be precise, Ms. Hopwood could ask, “What about me?” If,
in fact, diversity really is such an important interest, why did Texas
reject me? After all, I am a woman, and women are underrepresented
in the legal profession and the Texas Bar. Moreover, I am older than
most applicants and diverse for that reason. I have raised a handicapped child and mentored others, all the while pulling almost
“straight A’s” and working my way through college. Certainly I have
a “unique perspective” on family, education, and work—a perspective
not likely shared by most applicants. If Texas was really interested
in diversity, it would have given me individual consideration, consideration that would have resulted in my admission. Instead, what

86. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1047-52
(1998).
87. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the American Association of Law Schools, the
American Council on Education, the Law School Admission Council and the Graduate
Management Admissions Council in Support of Petitioners at 8-14, Texas v. Hopwood, 533
U.S. 929 (2001) (No. 00-1609) (explaining race as a “critical component” in education programs). More significantly, in 2003 Supreme Court decisions upholding affirmative action
at the University of Michigan, “[n]inety-one colleges and universities, as well as every major educational association, filed briefs in support of the university.” Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 368 (2003). Not one college filed a brief opposing race preferences. “These briefs argued that ‘pluralistic, widely representative’ colleges provide a more enriching learning environment and better preparation for life in a
multiracial world . . . .” See id. at 368 (citing briefs).
88. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (asserting that a properly administered plus system would not constitute
intentional discrimination); Sullivan, supra note 86, at 1049-52.
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“consideration” I did receive merely downgraded my application—
that is, gave me a “minus” instead of a plus!
To be sure, this story may seem unduly “personal.” Moreover, it
would appear calculated to elicit sympathy from the Court hearing
Ms. Hopwood’s claim. But, sympathy aside, the story just told would
seem to cast significant light upon the strength and nature of interests at stake where Texas’ racial preferences are concerned. To begin
with, Ms. Hopwood’s story casts serious doubt on any assertion that
the Texas program is somehow “race-neutral” because it involves individual consideration of diversity factors other than race. If the
Texas plan is race-neutral, one might ask, why did Ms. Hopwood not
receive a “plus” for her own unique characteristics, or at least some
meaningful consideration of them?89 Moreover, by pursuing diversity
inconsistently, the school has called into question its own assertion
that such an interest really is compelling in a constitutional sense.90
At the very least, the realization that Texas is pursuing racial diversity simpliciter would impose upon it a much heavier burden of justification.91
As noted above, Allan Bakke could not saddle Texas with such a
burden. Simply put, he has a different story to tell. He is a white
male, who, like many applicants, comes from a prestigious undergraduate university. There is no indication that he has overcome any
particular obstacles or that he has any attributes not shared by numerous other individuals in the applicant pool, many of whom have
better academic credentials than he. Thus, the failure of Texas to accord Mr. Bakke’s application any special consideration seems per89. To be sure, even with such a plus, she may have still been rejected—Texas may
have properly downgraded her Texas Index score because her grade point average, adjusted for her college and undergraduate major, overstated her academic potential. Such a
downgrade, however, could only be “proper” if Texas also downgraded minority applicants
in similar circumstances. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 939.
90. See Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 381, 387-88 (1998); see
also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993)
(noting that an interest that is not pursued consistently cannot be deemed compelling);
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978).
91. One way of meeting this burden is to shift rationales, that is, to argue that race
preferences are remedial. To do so, however, raises problems of its own. Even if a state
university is willing to admit that it has discriminated in the past, it may not be able to
convince a court that it has, in fact, discriminated in the past. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292-93 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (discussing the type of evidence that must be introduced to convince a court
about past discrimination). More significantly, because it fears exposing itself to liability, a
university may be reluctant to admit that it has discriminated in the past. Thus, there is
some risk that the proponents of affirmative action may understate the reasons supporting
racial preferences. For this very reason, African-American students at the University of
Michigan intervened in Gratz v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 244, 257 (2003). In our view, courts
should hear the stories of all affected interests. For this reason, liberalized intervention
may be a sensible and appropriate way to overcome some of the problems of anchoring on
an incomplete data set.
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fectly consistent with the assertion that it is pursuing diversity in a
consistent, race-neutral fashion.
It would thus appear that, while legally identical, Ms. Hopwood’s
and Mr. Bakke’s claims would produce different records on which
Courts would base their decisions. It is difficult to say that the Texas
plan has really harmed Allan Bakke: it seems unlikely that he would
have been admitted under a race-neutral scheme. Thus, the record
produced by his case would suggest that the school had pursued a
policy of racial diversity without casting an inordinate burden—
indeed, any burden—on non-minorities like the plaintiff. Ms. Hopwood, on the other hand, appears to possess a stronger application.
Perhaps more significant, one record suggests that Texas is not
really pursuing diversity at all but is instead simply pursuing some
strategy of race-based proportional representation. Another will appear perfectly consistent—or at least not inconsistent—with the bona
fide pursuit of a diversity strategy. Thus, the type of record the Court
will see first, and hence its “anchor” where racial preferences in education are concerned, will depend upon which case the Court hears
first. From this anchor, of course, the Court may well generate a rule
about whether diversity is not a compelling government interest, a
rule that will apply to the case that it did not hear. Thus, a generalizable rule will be produced based upon the facts that are not, in
fact, generalizable.
This is not to say that different facts will necessarily produce different results. It is possible that the Court could reach the same outcome—voiding or approving of preferences—regardless of which case
it chooses to hear first. Some Justices may have hard-and-fast views
on the permissibility vel non of preferences, views that cannot be
changed.92 Other Justices, however, may be less sure of their views
and more likely to take into account the facts of the case.93 Where, as
92. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-28 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356-79 (Brennan, J., concurring). These
views may reflect strong “prior commitments” to particular constitutional values, such as
equality before the law. Or, they may reflect personal experience or knowledge with the
manner in which certain admissions processes operate. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease As
Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH.
U. L.Q. 147 (1979).
93. Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor. Before deciding to uphold preferences in
Grutter, her views on the constitutionality of affirmative action were unclear. Notwithstanding the fact that she had sat on the Court for more than two decades and written several opinions on the constitutionality of affirmative action, O’Connor’s decisions provided
little concrete guidance for how she would rule on the constitutionality of preferences. For
example, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), O’Connor’s decision
for the Court was indeterminate. Although concluding that strict scrutiny review should be
utilized in affirmative action cases, O’Connor also sought to “dispel the notion that strict
scrutiny [review] is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)). Compare
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612-31 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
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is often the case when racial preferences are concerned, such Justices
provide the “swing votes,” cognitive biases and the identity of the
first plaintiff who challenges the scheme in question may well carry
the day.
Even if the outcome of the Court’s view of a particular program
does not depend upon the facts presented, the way the Court explains
that outcome might. Consider in this regard the Bakke case, where
the Court evaluated a quota scheme, a scheme defended on the
ground that it was necessary to enhance the diversity of the entering
class.94 Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court explicitly held that the quota scheme was unconstitutional.95
However, Powell also opined that “diversity” was a compelling state
interest and that schools could properly seek to advance this interest
by employing a plus system that gave credit to minorities and other
diverse applicants for their diversity.96 In so doing, he did not rely
upon any factual findings about the manner in which such a system
actually operated, accepting amici’s assertions at face value.97
Imagine now what might have happened if Allan Bakke had instead been Cheryl Hopwood. To be sure, there is no difference between these two plaintiffs that would suggest a different ruling on
the validity of quotas. But what about Justice Powell’s advice regarding the validity of a so-called plus system? Would Powell have issued
this advice if Cheryl Hopwood had been the plaintiff? Perhaps not.
Ms. Hopwood possessed important diversity characteristics. A failure
by the University of California at Davis (“Davis”) to recognize and
consider those characteristics when comparing her application to
those of other non-minority applicants may well have given Justice
Powell pause as he decided whether to go beyond his condemnation
of quotas and endorse a plus system.98 More precisely, a failure by
Davis to accord Ms. Hopwood any individualized consideration would
have called into question any assertion that diversity was a compelling state interest.99 Such failure could also have caused Powell skepthat diversity preferences in broadcasting rested upon an impermissible stereotype), with
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(refusing to consider whether racial diversity would support consideration of race when
hiring high school teachers). For an excellent treatment of “swing Justices” that uses Justice O’Connor as a case study, see Dahlia Lithwick, A High Court of One: The Role of the
“Swing Voter” in the 2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 2004).
94. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
95. See id. at 314-15, 318-20 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
96. See id. at 315-19.
97. See Meese, supra note 90, at 384-86 (explaining how amici curiae raised the issue
of “plus factor” systems for the first time in the Supreme Court).
98. There is no indication that Davis did, in fact, consider diversity characteristics of
non-minorities.
99. See Meese, supra note 90, at 387.
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ticism about the bona fides of a plus system and may well have led
the Justice to adhere to his initial course, to vote to void Davis’s
quota plan while leaving the validity of a plus system for another
day.100 Thus, any statement about the validity of a plus system would
have awaited a controversy in which the question was squarely presented and not simply raised in amici briefs.101 Such a delay would
certainly have altered the discourse in the political branches about
the constitutional status of preferences. For instance, politicians
could no longer justify such preferences by hiding behind the cover of
Bakke but would instead be forced to take responsibility for their own
interpretation of the Constitution.102 Nor could individual institutions
or their trade associations be able to rely upon Bakke.103
And what if Bakke, instead of involving a challenge to a set-aside,
concerned a “plus factor” scheme? Of course, if Alan Bakke were the
plaintiff, the Justices would have approved such a scheme.104 But
what if Cheryl Hopwood were the plaintiff? Here, there is every reason to think that the Court would have questioned the legitimacy of a
diversity scheme that excluded someone as sympathetic as Cheryl
Hopwood. Indeed, it was for this very reason that the right-leaning
Center for Individual Rights recruited Cheryl Hopwood to be the lead
plaintiff in its challenge to the University of Texas’ affirmative action
program.105 In other words, just as Bakke was skewed by an unsympathetic plaintiff, future challenges to affirmative action may well
100. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 486-87 (1994) (explaining that Powell initially planned simply to affirm the judgment of the California Supreme
Court voiding Davis’s quota scheme); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 79-86 (1988) (showing that Justice Powell’s initial draft
simply voided the Davis quota system without opining on the validity of a plus system). Is
it possible that Powell—rather than defend the legitimacy of plus systems—would have
questioned all diversity-based justifications for affirmative action?
101. Ironically, Justice Powell followed just such a course in a subsequent antitrust decision. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), the Court evaluated a finding that the defendant had terminated the plaintiff pursuant to a price-fixing
conspiracy. The United States filed an amicus brief arguing that such conspiracies should
be analyzed under the Rule of Reason and not considered unlawful per se, as was the case
under current law. In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court declined to consider the
United States’ argument on the ground that it was first raised in an amicus brief. See id.
at 761, n.7.
102. See Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Program; Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58510 (Oct. 10, 1979) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 80) (contending that Bakke affirmed the legality of racial preferences).
103. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, at 160-63.
104. In such a case, Justice Powell’s dicta about “plus factor” schemes would have become the Court’s holding.
105. See Michael S. Greve, The Demise of Race-Based Admissions Policies, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 19, 1989, at B6 (Center for Individual Rights (CIR) cofounder describing Hopwood litigation as “an opening salvo” in a “larger strategy”); Jonathan Groner, Center Ring, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, at 1; David Segal, Putting Affirmative Action on Trial,
WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1998, at A1 (describing CIR efforts to seek out sympathetic plaintiffs).
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involve plaintiffs who are far more diverse than the typical nonminority applicant.
B. Church-State Separation: The Case of School Vouchers
Just as the class of potential plaintiffs can be heterogeneous, different defendants can also tell dramatically different stories. Interest
group litigators understand this; they are as determined to find an
unsympathetic defendant as they are in locating a sympathetic
plaintiff. Consider, for example, the case of school vouchers. Some defendants can tell a compelling story about voucher plans providing
an escape route from failing public school systems for disproportionately poor, disproportionately minority students. Other defendants,
however, are far less sympathetic; their voucher schemes may seem
little more than an economic windfall to religious parents already
committed to sending their children to religious schools.106
Like affirmative action, an understanding of the costs and benefits of voucher programs cannot be based on the examination of any
single plan; instead, it requires familiarity with the range of voucher
plans employed by school systems. Were the Court to build its
voucher doctrine around nongeneralizable cases, it might well commit error. Decisionmaking anchored on the facts of a sympathetic defendant might result in standards of review that discount the risks of
a state-funded religious spoils system. But doctrine moored to the
facts of an unsympathetic defendant might foreclose all voucher
schemes, even those that are well designed to serve compelling governmental interests.
As it turns out, Supreme Court decisions on this issue are closely
tied to the specific facts before the Court. In 1973, the Court—while
not ruling on the constitutionality of a voucher scheme—signaled its
skepticism of such programs. Rejecting a New York plan that would
provide either a “tuition reimbursement grant” or tax relief to parents who send their children to private schools, the Court found it irrelevant that the “grants are delivered to parents rather than
schools.”107 As we will soon detail, this decision, Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, was very much influenced
by the fact that Catholic school interests helped shape the New York

106. Of course, whether such programs really are a windfall would depend upon the
baseline that one adopts. If one begins with a baseline of state monopoly schools, supported
by coercive levies, without regard to the benefits the taxpayer might receive from such programs, then vouchers provide a windfall of sorts to parents who send their children to private schools. If, on the other hand, one assumes a common law baseline, where individuals
pay taxes only when necessary to produce collective goods, then vouchers are not a windfall
but, instead, simply a method of returning to taxpayers who send their children to private
school money they have overpaid.
107. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781-83 (1973).
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law (and, correspondingly, that eighty-five percent of participating
schools were church-affiliated).108
By 2002, however, the Court approved a Cleveland, Ohio, voucher
program precisely because parents, not schools, were given vouchers.
Concluding that the Cleveland program “confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion,”109 the Court thought it irrelevant that eighty-two
percent of the participating schools were religious, principally Catholic.110 In reaching this 5-4 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the
factual background of the case may have been controlling. Unlike the
New York plan, religious school interests were not the driving force
behind the Cleveland plan. The driving force, instead, was Cleveland’s failing public school system.111
Before providing additional details about the New York and
Cleveland plans, we readily concede that the Court’s approval of one
plan and rejection of the other may also be tied to material differences between the two plans.112 The problem with New York’s “parental choice” program was that the state’s claims about its desire to invest in secular education, not religious indoctrination, did not jibe
with the statutory scheme. Most notably, while the Cleveland plan
forbade participating schools from making religious-based admission
decisions, the New York plan allowed such schools to participate in
the program.113 But even if the two plans were identical, proponents
of the Cleveland plan would have a much better story to tell than
those backing the New York plan. More to the point, just as Cheryl

108. Id. at 768. For additional discussion, see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying
text.
109. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
110. Id. at 657. Likewise, the Court did not take into account the fact that some of the
participating schools had a pervasively sectarian character. One school, for example, noted
in its informational materials that “‘total religious instruction is the major focus of the
educational program. . . . Lessons learned in formal religious classes are purposefully carried over into all subject areas.’” Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School
Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 417, 434 (2000) (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (N.D.
Ohio 1999)).
111. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-45, 647.
112. With that said, Nyquist and Zelman make use of different standards of review. In
his Zelman dissent, Justice David Souter contrasts the two rulings. Applauding the Nyquist Court’s examination of where state funds wind up, Souter condemns the Zelman
Court for only asking whether secular schools are eligible to participate in the Cleveland
program. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 692-93 (Souter, J., dissenting). For Souter, this analysis is
simply “rhetorical,” replacing “realism [with] formalism.” Id. at 700, 693 (Souter, J., dissenting). Whatever one thinks of Souter’s analysis, we certainly agree that the Court’s reasoning in Zelman and Nyquist are difficult to square.
113. The New York statute, moreover, also included direct aid to private schools. These
schools were overwhelmingly Catholic. This difference, however, supports our argument.
Rather than sever this provision, the Court understood the other provisions through the
lens of state efforts to favor Catholic school interests.
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Hopwood was better positioned than Alan Bakke to call attention to
limits in Texas’ diversity rationale, defenders of the Cleveland plan
were better able to highlight the secular benefits of a voucher
scheme.
Assume that New York and Cleveland both adopt the following
voucher program:114 Students whose family income is not more than
200% of the federal poverty level are eligible to receive a voucher of
up to $5000. Participating schools cannot charge more than $5000
nor can they deny admission to students on the basis of religion or
race. No restrictions are placed on how the schools may use the
money—so that participating schools could make use of state funds
to support religious activities. Participating schools, however, cannot
advocate or foster hatred on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion.
Assume also that eighty-five percent of participating schools are religious, although that number can fluctuate.115
Because the overwhelming number of schools that benefit from
this voucher plan are religious, New York and Cleveland will have to
explain why this funding scheme does not impermissibly establish
religion. Up to a point, New York and Cleveland will make identical
arguments. They will note that secular schools may participate in the
program and that the number of secular schools may well increase
over time.116 They may also point out that the relevant “program” is
not simply the voucher scheme but instead all public financial support for education, including the creation and maintenance of the
public schools. If so, then support for sectarian schools would consume only a small portion of the state’s overall expenditures on education and thus would not advance religion in any meaningful
sense.117 Correspondingly, they will argue that the program “distributes aid to parents, who in turn redirect that aid to participating
schools through entirely uncoerced decisions.”118 As such, parents are
114. The following program largely mirrors the Cleveland plan that the Supreme Court
upheld in Zelman. For descriptions of the Cleveland program, see Zelman, 536 U.S. at 64448; and Macedo, supra note 110, at 433-38.
115. Indeed, as Milton and Rose Friedman argued, this percentage could depend upon
the presence or absence of a voucher scheme. In particular, the Friedmans argued that the
existence of a voucher scheme would actually increase the proportion of nonsectarian private schools, because such a scheme would attract profit-maximizing enterprises to a
field—private schooling—currently dominated by nonprofit, religious enterprises. See
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 15254 (1980) [hereinafter FREE TO CHOOSE].
116. Brief on the Merits at 36, Zelman (No. 00-1779) (noting that “the present statistics present only a snapshot in the evolving life of the program”); see also FREE TO CHOOSE,
supra note 115, at 152-54.
117. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111
YALE L.J. 1311, 1364-67 (2002) (explaining how the Court has addressed the issue of religious funding and the Establishment clause).
118. Brief of State Petitioners at 21, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779); see also
Brief for Appellees-Appellants Nyquist, Levitt and Gallman at 22, Nyquist (Nos. 72-694,
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free to choose to send their children to a religious school, nonreligious
school, or even keep their child in the public school system. Finally,
they will call attention to the critical role that religious schools can
and do play in providing secular education to students. For example,
they will cite statistics demonstrating the “outstanding secular education and citizenship achievements” at religious schools, including
comparatively high scores on national achievement tests.119
Notwithstanding similarities in the arguments that New York
and Cleveland would make, the factual contexts of the two cases are
profoundly different. As already noted, the New York plan was enacted at the behest of powerful religious interests.120 Claiming that
low-income parents would soon remove their children from nonpublic
schools, religious school interests argued both that the state had an
independent interest in allowing low-income parents to send their
children to nonpublic schools and that the state would face a fiscal
crisis if students attending religious schools were to attend public
schools.121
By validating this argument, New York lawmakers did more than
save the state some money. They also facilitated religious segregation.122 Religious parents already committed to sending their children
to a religious school would continue to do so. And even if a significant
number of nonadherents were to attend religious school, the New
York statute was nonetheless intended to help religious schools
maintain enrollment levels.
72-753, 72-791, 72-929) (stating that the program “does not provide for payment of money
directly to the schools but merely recognizes the financial burden of parents of nonpublic
school children”).
119. Brief for the Hanna Perkins School, et al., Petitioners at 11, Zelman (No. 001777).
120. Brief for Appellants at 14, Nyquist (Nos. 72-691, 72-753, 72-791, 72-929) (noting
newspaper coverage of the statute’s enactment made clear that “sectarian pressures
play[ed] a significant if not major role” in the bill’s passage); Brief of the Baptist Joint
Committee of Public Affairs as Amicus Curiae at 8, Nyquist (No. 72-694) (arguing that
“[o]nly these religious schools were active in encouraging the legislature to enact the contested legislation”); Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31
CONN. L. REV. 807, 816-22 (1999) (discussing power of religious interests to obtain state
funding).
121. State officials explicitly embraced this argument. A brief filed by the majority
leader of the New York State Senate detailed the state fiscal crisis and the difficulties that
many communities would face if religious school students were to attend public schools.
Brief on Behalf of Appellee Warren M. Anderson at 11-15, Nyquist (Nos. 72-601, 72-753,
72-791, 72-929).
122. In Nyquist, eighty-five percent of parents eligible to receive tuition support sent
their children to Catholic schools. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the National Education Association and the Horace Mann League at 16, Nyquist (No.72-694). And while the
New York statute allowed religious schools to make religion-based admissions decisions, a
statute that forbid such an admissions policy would nevertheless result in a significant
amount of religious isolation. In particular, if the beneficiaries of the program were principally parents who already enrolled their children in religious schools, it is almost certainly
the case that those schools would maintain their religious identity.
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Cleveland would not be saddled with the burdens of defending a
plan that smacks of religious favoritism. Its plan could be distinguished from the ostensibly identical New York plan in the following
way: “To put it simply, in [New York], religious schools were the
ends, while here religious schools are part of the means toward the
goal of broadening [secular] educational opportunities.”123 Specifically, even if eighty-five percent of the participating schools in New
York and Cleveland are religious, the impetus for the Cleveland plan
was a failing public school system.
Before adopting a voucher scheme in Cleveland, a federal district
court judge “declared a ‘crisis of magnitude’ and placed the entire
Cleveland school district under state control.”124 A state auditor likewise found that Cleveland’s public schools “were in the midst of a
‘crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American education.’”125 The district failed to meet any of the eighteen standards
set by the state to guarantee minimal acceptable performance.126
More than two-thirds of students dropped or flunked out of high
school (and those who did graduate performed less well than their
counterparts in other cities).127 Making matters worse, the vast majority of children attending Cleveland public schools were from lowincome and minority families.128 In other words, unlike the potential
fiscal crisis that prompted New York lawmakers, the Cleveland
voucher scheme could easily be portrayed as a needed effort to save
overwhelmingly poor, overwhelmingly minority students from one of
the “worst performing public schools in the Nation.”129
The Cleveland scheme, moreover, was intended to encourage parents to remove their children from failing public schools. In contrast,
the beneficiaries of the New York program were parents who had already removed their children from public schools, principally to attend religious schools. Consequently, defenders of the Cleveland
plan—unlike their New York counterparts—could argue that their
voucher scheme was no more and no less than an effort to provide
better educational opportunities for predominantly poor, predominantly minority students. Defenders of the New York plan, in con-

123. Brief on the Merits at 15, Zelman (No. 00-1779) (distinguishing Nyquist from the
Cleveland plan).
124. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644 (citation omitted).
125. Id. (quoting JIM PETRO, AUDITOR OF STATE, STATE OF OHIO, CLEVELAND CITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT PERFORMANCE AUDIT 2-1 (Mar. 1996)).
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id.
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trast, could not escape the fact that their plan was first and foremost
an effort to accommodate religious parents.130
One other argument would be available to proponents of the
Cleveland plan. The racial composition of private schools participating in the voucher plan is more likely to reflect the overall composition of the Cleveland metropolitan area than are the Cleveland public schools.131 In particular, because Cleveland’s inner-city public
schools are overwhelmingly minority, the voucher plan might well facilitate, not subvert, racial integration within the schools.132 Defenders of the New York plan could not make this argument. Religious
schools, including Catholic schools, are often highly segregated.133 A
voucher plan that encouraged parents of private school students to
keep those students in private schools would not facilitate racial integration.
To summarize, differences in the stories that New York and
Cleveland can tell about their respective voucher schemes might well
prove consequential, even determinative, to the Supreme Court.
Even if the two plans had identical provisions and even if the same
percentage of religious schools were participating in both programs,
the records of the two cases would be quite different. Opponents of
the New York plan could argue that the plan was intended to
strengthen sectarian education, preserve the status quo, and, in so
doing, segregate students on religious grounds. Opponents to the
Cleveland voucher, in contrast, would have a far more difficult time
convincing the Court to adopt a legal rule that would deem vouchers
an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Their demand that
voucher schemes must include a sizable percentage of nonreligious
private schools might appear insensitive to governmental efforts to
change the status quo by finding innovative ways to help dispropor130. Rather than reinforce religious segregation, the vast majority of students participating in the Cleveland plan would be attending schools of a different faith than their own.
Brief for the Hanna Perkins School, et al., Petitioners at 8, Zelman (No. 00-1777). Indeed,
parents participating in the voucher plan thought the religious affiliation of a school was
the least important of five listed factors. Brief of State Petitioners at 11, Zelman (Nos. 001751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
131. Brief of American Education Reform Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779) (citations omitted).
132. Opponents of the voucher plan strongly disagreed with this claim. Noting that a
disproportionate number of white students were participating in the voucher plan, opponents claimed that the voucher plan exacerbated problems of racial isolation in the Cleveland public schools. See Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association, et al. at
17-18, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779) (citing KIM METCALF, IND. CTR. FOR
EVALUATION, EVALUATION OF THE CLEVELAND SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 1998-2000,
TECHNICAL REPORT (2001)).
133. Robert L. Crain & Christine H. Rossell, Catholic Schools and Racial Segregation,
in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 184, 185 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989). For a competing
perspective, see JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC,
CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982).
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tionately poor, disproportionately minority students attending failing
schools.134
It would thus appear that facts played a large part in the Court’s
disparate rulings in Nyquist and Zelman. Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist was the only Justice to participate in both cases, the social
meaning of school vouchers had undergone a radical transformation
by the time of the Cleveland case.135 Justice O’Connor, for example,
wrapped up her concurring opinion in Zelman by suggesting that the
“reasoning in the Court’s opinion” matched “the realities of the
Cleveland educational system.”136 In other words, just as Nyquist
may have been skewed by an unsympathetic defendant, Zelman, too,
may have been impacted by a sympathetic defendant. As in the affirmative action context, the Court’s reasoning on the issue of the
separation of church and state may be closely tied to the relative
sympathies of the parties to the dispute.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF DELAYING STRATEGIES
When deciding cases involving nongeneralizable claims, the Supreme Court is apt to base its decision in faulty factual suppositions.
As our case studies on affirmative action and school vouchers make
clear, these cases involve idiosyncratic facts that do not shed sufficient light on the competing constitutional values involved. For example, by deciding the Bakke case in 1978, the Court grounded much
of its affirmative action jurisprudence around a plaintiff who shed
almost no light on the costs and benefits of diversity-based affirmative action. Likewise, the 1973 Nyquist decision was anchored in a
set of facts that highlighted the downsides of voucher schemes. At
the same time, had the Court built its affirmative action doctrine
around Cheryl Hopwood or its voucher doctrine around the failed
Cleveland public school system, the Court might have issued rulings
that were equally out of step with reality. Indeed, the Court’s implicit
repudiation of Nyquist in its 2002 Zelman decision calls attention to
the problems of building durable doctrine around nongeneralizable
facts.

134. Admittedly, the public school establishment and some of the civil rights establishment opposes vouchers, claiming that the state ought to invest in public education. In
Zelman, for example, the National School Boards Association and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund both filed briefs opposing the voucher plan. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643.
135. For an overview of the changed meaning of school vouchers from 1980-2000, see
Neal Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919 (2001).
136. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Other Justices may have
found differences in the stories that New York and Cleveland could tell to be legally irrelevant. In cases where the Court is divided 5-4, however, the views of one or two Justices
may prove dispositive both to the outcome and to the legal reasoning employed by the
Court.
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What, then, should the Supreme Court do when confronted with
nongeneralizable claims? Should the Justices issue narrow factspecific minimalist decisions? Should they quickly issue more decisive rulings and simply overturn those decisions when the doctrine
proves unworkable? Or should they issue decisive rulings but use
certiorari denials and other delaying strategies to provide lower federal courts with an opportunity to develop a factual record on the issue?137 In sorting out which approach is best, one’s view of the Court’s
institutional role and capacity will prove decisive. For reasons that
we will now detail, we think that the Supreme Court ought to make
use of delaying strategies when first confronted with nongeneralizable claims.
As noted throughout this Article, judges generate precedent based
upon the set of information present in the particular case before
them. These precedents, for a variety of reasons, are hard to overrule. As explained in Part II, anchoring and heuristics that decisionmakers rely upon make it harder to rethink the factual premises of
earlier determinations. Furthermore, even a judge that wishes to
change his mind will face other costs of doing so—costs that are unrelated to the biases we have described and instead are inherent in
what it means to be a judge, at least in our culture. To begin with,
predictability and certainty in the legal system demand a strong presumption that like cases be treated alike. A Court that made clear
that every past decision was constantly “up for grabs” would sow confusion among the public, vastly increase its own docket, and call into
question its own competence.138 Litigants, moreover, would not want
to spend significant resources gathering information, filing briefs,
and making arguments knowing full well that today’s decision might
be reversed tomorrow.139 Failure to reverse itself, however, will leave
the Court subject to increasing criticism for adhering to a rule based
on incomplete facts.140 One would not be surprised if the Court chose
instead to take a “middle course,” backtracking slowly, while recharacterizing prior caselaw without formerly overruling it. Such a muddling course raises its own set of problems. While avoiding the ille137. Another option would be to use justiciablity doctrine to steer clear of the dispute
altogether. We will not discuss this option for two reasons. First, a nongeneralizable claim
may be clearly justiciable. Second, as we will soon explain, we think that the Supreme
Court should play an important and active role in shaping constitutional values.
138. CARDOZO, supra note 61, at 149 (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost
to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”); cf.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (“There is a limit to the amount of
error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts.”).
139. But if litigants have an understanding of the phenomenon of anchoring, they may
well still invest significant resources in litigation, knowing that first impressions matter,
even if courts do not otherwise adhere to something like stare decisis.
140. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 841-44 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977).
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gitimacy costs of overturning doctrine, this mangling of stare decisis
undermines predictability and certainty in the legal system. By turning stare decisis into a shell game, moreover, this muddling course
calls into question the Court’s ability to fashion longstanding, predictable rules.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court ought not to rely on
first impressions in making far-reaching decisions. While lower
courts have no choice but to rule on such cases, the Supreme Court
must take into account the obvious risk that a “wrong” impression
will generate the wrong rule. Moreover, for reasons just detailed, certain aspects of the legal system and judicial culture likely serve to
exacerbate the negative consequences of such decisionmaking.
Pointing to inherent limits in judicial capacity, a new breed of judicial minimalists argues that the Court is ill equipped to issue broad
and deep rulings that are grounded in facts.141 Instead, these minimalists argue that the Court ought to facilitate democratic deliberation by issuing narrow rulings (some of which may simply be provisional).142 In our view, however, judicial minimalism throws the baby
out with the bath water. While protecting the Court from overly
broad rulings grounded in faulty factual suppositions, the issuing of
narrow, indeterminate rulings unduly limits the Court’s power to
shape constitutional values.
Specifically, with little law to follow, elected officials will either
ignore the Court or, alternatively, spin indeterminate Supreme Court
decisions to serve their own purposes.143 Political branch interpretation should not take place in such a vacuum but, instead, should be
part of a dialogue between the political branches and the Court, each
of which brings different perspectives and expertise to bear on constitutional problems. In particular, courts are more likely than other
government actors to “appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth
their aspirations”144 and to be a “voice of reason . . . articulating and
developing impersonal and durable principles.”145
The logic of our system of checks and balances is that “the effectiveness of the whole depends on [each branch’s] involvement with
one another . . . even if it often is the sweaty intimacy of creatures

141. See generally Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000).
142. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 259.
143. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
144. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (2d ed. 1962).
145. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreward: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959); see also Neal Devins, The DemocracyForcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1999) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)).
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locked in combat.”146 More to the point, just as the courts need elected
government to implement their decisions, the political branches need
the courts. By sometimes invoking high-sounding principles when
striking down elected-government action, Court rulings upholding
governmental decisionmaking have greater force.147
In sorting out how to approach nongeneralizable cases, the Court
must recognize its strengths and its limits. On the one hand, the
Court must speak clearly and persuasively if it is to shape the
method and context of constitutional discourse undertaken by the political branches. At the same time, a Court that pays no mind to the
facts and simply announces broad pronouncements of the Constitution’s meaning will often render unworkable decisions. For reasons
we will now detail, we think that there is a mechanism by which the
Court can balance inherent limits in judicial factfinding with its
needs to speak forcefully on constitutional questions. Specifically, we
think that the Court ought to employ a case management approach,
using certiorari denials and other “passive virtues” to provide a time
lag between governmental action and adjudication.148
By exercising great caution before deciding nongeneralizable
cases, the Court may fully engage itself in these disputes at a time
when the “facts” are better known to it and to the nation. Under this
proposal, of course, politicians and lower court judges will (at least
initially) have free reign to decide these issues. But when the Supreme Court enters the fray, it will do so at a time when it is better
positioned both to speak clearly and to make an informed decision. In
particular, by allowing several lower court judges to develop facts
through adversarial litigation, the Court need not rely on works of
advocacy (party and amicus briefs). Moreover, by letting the facts
“percolate” this way, the Court is less bound by the arguments made
by the parties to a single lawsuit and, consequently, will better appreciate what issues are presented by the case before it. While such a
strategy would leave lower courts susceptible to the various biases
we have described, it would allow the Supreme Court to avoid them.
For, by deferring its own decision until several lower courts have
spoken, the Court can assume that any decision it makes is premised
upon a relatively full information set—that is, the facts and opinions
of the various lower courts that have heard admittedly nongeneraliz146. BICKEL, supra note 144, at 261.
147. Charles L. Black, Jr. has explained the way that this works: “What a government
of limited powers needs, at the beginning and forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps humanly possible to stay within its powers. . . . [T]he Court,
through its history, has acted as the legitimator of the government.” CHARLES L. BLACK,
JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 52 (1960).
148. For the definitive treatment of the “passive virtues,” see BICKEL, supra note 144,
at 111-98. Needless to say, our proposal is influenced by Bickel’s writings (even though
Bickel never considered the question of judicial misperceptions of facts).
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able cases. By aggregating the facts and opinions of these various
cases, the Court can ensure that its “anchor” better reflects the great
variety of plaintiffs and programs.
“How to inform the judicial mind,” Justice Frankfurter once commented, “is one of the most complicated problems” confronting the
Supreme Court.149 When it comes to nongeneralizable cases, this
problem is acute. In explaining why this is so, this Article has highlighted limits in judicial factfinding. At the same time, by making
use of a modified case management plan, the Court can arm itself
with a robust information set. In so doing, it can play a meaningful
and constructive role in shaping constitutional values in cases involving nongeneralizable facts.

149. ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 63 (Leon Friedman ed., 1983) (quoting Justice Frankfurter).

